The nuclearization of India and Pakistan in South Asian complex environment has changed the pattern of conflicts between these two states. Total war or a full-scale war is now a delusion because of its huge cost, but still, deterrence has not produced the lasting peace. Instead, it has created a strategic environment in which strategic stability at a nuclear level creates space for conflict below the nuclear threshold. Nuclear weapons are limited India’s ability to respond decisively. The nuclearized environment of South Asia leads India toward the new normal by the use of limited precise military actions to maintain credibility, manage threats, and respond to adversaries without triggering a broader war.
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is neither documented nor disclosed to public which creates a fog of war in which red line is blurred and the adversary can cross the nuclear threshold and due to this India always remains in fear of Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. The asymmetry between India and Pakistan creates a problem. India may see a short strike as controlled and limited, but on the other hand, Pakistan may interpret the same action as a threat to its survival. When both states don’t share the same understanding of escalation thresholds, the risk of miscalculation rises.
India’s Sunderji Doctrine
India’s “Sunderji Doctrine” relied on full mobilization and large Strike Corps. In a nuclearized environment, this approach became risky, and slow mobilization weakened deterrence, credibility, deep penetrations, and risk of crossing Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. The failure of Sundarji Doctrine led towards the development of “Cold Start Doctrine” of India.
It emerged to conduct rapid, shallow operations in Pakistan without triggering nuclear thresholds. The objective was not territorial conquest but controlled punishment. Cold Start also exposed the limits of limited war thinking. Pakistan responded with counter measures such as lowering nuclear thresholds and developing tactical nuclear weapons such as Nasr missiles.
When Cold Start Doctrine became less feasible, the concept of “New Normal” rises, which is about controlled military action under nuclear environment and the target of Pakistan against any minor skirmishes. This new normal is risky in practice. Each limited action shortens the decision making time and pressures the other state to respond, raising the risk of escalation.
The effect on strategic stability is clear. India’s longing for limited war lowers threshold, increases crisis frequency and encourages counter measures.
Pakistan’s Emphasis on Deterrence
Pakistan has attained the “Babur-3” Cruise missiles and “Agosta-90B” submarines, which strengthen Pakistan’s second strike and lead toward assured second strike capability as well as strengthen deter ability. Pakistan’s emphasis on deterrence signaled low tolerance, complicating India’s ability to employ force without risking escalation. The adoption of a conventional weapon system, Taimoor weapon system by Pakistan will strengthen its credible minimum deterrence because of its low altitude and targets effectively in addition to not being detected by India’s S-400.
The Kargil War, 2016 surgical strikes, 2019 air strikes and recent air strikes of 2025 which caused operation “Bunyan-Ul-Marsos” in response to India’s operation “Sindoor” reflect India’s limited war under nuclear constraints. Air power and drones have become essential tools, allowing India to respond decisively and maintain deterrence without engaging in prolonged conflict. Repeated crisis compress decision making timelines, increases the chance of miscalculation. This causes the destabilization of decapitation strike or counter-force strikes in a region, but Pakistan’s progress toward assured second strike capabilities limits India’s escalation space.
Tests of Deterrence Stability
The 1999, Kargil conflict represented the first major test of deterrence stability in nuclearized South Asia. Nuclear weapons automatically prevented conventional conflict. Military operations were limited to the Kargil sector, the international border was not crossed, and escalation was carefully managed. India’s goal was not to punish Pakistan or change borders.
Its goal was to restore the status quo (pre-kargil) positions. Objective was limited. Kargil incident considered first direct conflict between two nuclearized states. The war of Kargil happened due to a misunderstanding of India. After the peace treaty between Indian Prime minister Vajpayee and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Indian troops vacated some high altitude peak posts near line of Control because of extreme weather.
In response, the local Kashmiris which were actually freedom fighters took control there and India blamed Pakistan. It claimed that Pakistan violated the peace treaty, that these were not freedom fighters and rather they were NLI (Northern Light Infantry) soldiers. This misconception spread widely across international system. India launched operation “Vijay” and operation “Safed Sagar”. Indian army fought uphill battles to recapture peaks, and Indian Air force launched operation Safed Sagar, air strikes by its own side of Line of Control LOC. India did not cross the LOC to avoid escalation into full war.
Balakot Strikes by India
Balakot strikes by India took place after “Pulwama incident”. Airforce reflects India’s limited war approach because the use of force was deliberately narrow and their aim,what they claimed was to target militants or hostiles groups, not counter force target it was counter terror target and conducted a preemptive air strike against militant infrastructure and testing the state for military response below the nuclear threshold.
Pakistan responded when Indian jet crossed LOC and Indian aircraft was shot down by Pakistan air force and their pilot was captured and released him after de-escalation and cup of tea received by Indian pilot at which he said, “Tea was Fantastic”. This gesture reinforced the limited war logic on both sides, Pakistan’s objective was their deterrence and credibility. India avoided counterforce targets, limited escalation, and terminated the operation immediately and showed, that force can be used below the nuclear threshold.
Reality of Operation Sindoor
After the Pahalgam incident, India carried out Operation Sindoor, in which India claimed that they targeted the militant bases and tried hard to prove Pakistan as a terrorist state. However, Pakistan’s deterrence showed it is a peaceful state with Muslim majority.
They targeted the religious institutes where students were studying and their target was counter value, they carefully designed to attack without escalating the conflict. Pakistan then responded with Operation “Bunyan‑ul‑Marsoos”, in a controlled way, showing its strength by shot down of 7 Indian Rafale jets without turning the situation into a full-scale war. These events show how limited war takes place.
In a nuclearized South Asia, deterrence may prevent total war, but it leaves little margin for error. Strategic stability depends not on testing the limits of deterrence through limited war but on the recognition of how narrow and fragile these limits are. It can be suitable for strategic stability or may cause vice versa because of Pakistan’s first use of nuclear policy and blurs the line of threshold.
